Conditional forecasts of defense and commercial markets under Chinese military primacy, 2026 to 2035
Markets do not price whether China overtakes the United States. They price how. Three pathways run to one endpoint, and if the outputs converge, the thesis is false.
If China attains nuclear parity and Indo-Pacific conventional primacy by 2035, how do global defense expenditure, arms transfer flows, and commercial risk pricing reallocate, and does the pathway to primacy condition those outcomes more strongly than the fact of primacy itself?
The project refuses a single scenario. It builds three, runs each through parameters measured from the historical record, and reports full distributions rather than point estimates. It is deliberately not called prediction. There is no training data for an event that has never occurred, so the model estimates responses from history and imposes each scenario exogenously. Conditional forecasting with uncertainty propagation is the stronger epistemic position, and the project states it plainly rather than burying it.
Four commercial channels carry the transmission: semiconductors, shipping and war risk insurance, energy, and reserve currency composition. All four are carried in this build. Semiconductors as TSMC's own quarterly revenue with the 2027 capacity-tightness note; shipping as fleet, shipbuilding and connectivity structure plus the 2026 Gulf war-risk repricing, a 5.7x premium multiple measured from broker quotes; energy as chokepoint throughput and the Brent path; and reserves end to end, with the renminbi's settlement share measured monthly against its reserve share. The register below reads every artifact off disk with its row count, and the build refuses to publish this page if any is missing.
Each road terminates at the same nominal 2035 balance, which is what lets the model separate the effect of the route from the effect of the destination. If the three produced the same outputs, the thesis would be false.
China grows, the United States grows more slowly. The balance closes without an event. Hedging is gradual and markets reprice at the margin.
Primacy arrives because Washington withdraws. Allied budgets and supplier choices move first, before any Chinese gain registers.
A contingency resolves in Beijing's favor. Repricing is discontinuous: the shock quarter matters as much as the decade around it.
| No. | Claim | State |
|---|---|---|
| H1 | Identical 2035 endpoints, reached by different pathways, produce statistically distinguishable outcomes in defense expenditure and arms transfer flows. | |
| H2 | American retrenchment moves allied budgets and supplier market shares faster than Chinese growth alone: the hegemon's exit is the stronger signal. | |
| H3 | Reserve composition is the slowest and least pathway-sensitive commercial channel; the dollar's share erodes toward diversification, not toward the renminbi. | supported in this build |
hypothesis_panel.csv, one tidy table holding every test, evidence and
robustness row the three claims rest on.Each stage consumes only the artifacts of the stage before it, so every figure on this page is reproducible from the raw sources in a single pass.
parse_cofer.py, with an independent share reconciliation
that must pass to 0.05 pp or the build fails); the SIPRI expenditure workbook
(parse_milex.py, locating headers by content so the parser survives SIPRI's
annual re-layout); both SIPRI arms transfer files (parse_arms_transfers.py,
a thirty-thousand-row deal register aggregated into supplier concentration); twenty-seven
monthly Swift trackers (parse_swift.py, reading the data month from each
document, never the filename); four UNCTAD maritime tables
(parse_maritime.py); the EIA chokepoint report, the STEO workbook and nine
TSMC quarterly statements (parse_energy_semis.py); and the NATO burden table,
the FAS nuclear notebooks, recipient-level imports and the curated event, war-risk and
alliance tables (parse_security.py). Every extraction passes range gates so a
source redesign fails loudly instead of shipping a wrong number.calibrate.py). The alliance
feedback system regresses each allied tier's real growth on both principals' lagged growth,
HAC(3) over 1951 to 2025, and measures the 2022 mobilization differential and the named
retrenchment windows (calibrate_layer2.py). All parameters ship with
confidence intervals in two JSON artifacts.simulate.py), and a five-block system with
endogenous allied budgets annually to 2035 (simulate_layer2.py), which scores
the H1 separation test, projects arms demand through the measured delivery elasticity, and
attaches the 2026 Gulf war-risk multiple to demonstration events. Innovations are
bootstrapped from measured residuals, so simulated periods keep the true fat tails instead
of an imposed Gaussian.make_figures.py) and this page,
whose every number is injected from the pipeline's own artifacts by
build_dashboard_data.py and build_index.py.hypothesis_panel.csv, a single table holding every measurement behind the
three hypotheses (build_hypothesis_panel.py), alongside the fans, the
processed tables and payload.json; the repository remains the model of
record.A model someone can use is a model that names, in advance, the observables that would break it.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), quarterly through 2026-Q1, retrieved 24 July 2026. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database 1949 to 2025 (v1.2, April 2026) and Arms Transfers Database, retrieved 24 and 29 July 2026. Chinese expenditure figures are SIPRI estimates. Swift, RMB Tracker and Global Currency Tracker, twenty-seven monthly issues, April 2024 data through June 2026 data. NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries, 2026 edition. UNCTADstat maritime transport tables, retrieved 29 July 2026. US Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints and Short-Term Energy Outlook, July 2026. Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Notebook, 2025 and 2026 issues, with DOD China Military Power Report projections. TSMC, consolidated condensed financial statements, nine quarterly issues. TrendForce, 1Q26 foundry ranking, public highlight only. Joint War Committee circular JWLA-033 and Argus Media war-risk reporting, 2026. Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker, as context for the 2022 mobilization case.
Raw files are not redistributed in the repository, in keeping with the providers' terms;
the README explains where to obtain each of the fourteen source families and where to place
them. The simulation is seeded, so a re-run on the same data vintages reproduces every number
on this page exactly, in the order parse_cofer, parse_milex,
parse_arms_transfers, parse_swift, parse_maritime,
parse_energy_semis, parse_security, calibrate,
calibrate_layer2, simulate, simulate_layer2,
build_hypothesis_panel, make_figures,
build_dashboard_data, build_index.
cc by-nc 4.0
This page, its text, its figures and the code that produced them are © 2026 Alyssa Agard
and licensed under the
Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. You may share and adapt the material
with attribution for noncommercial purposes. The underlying IMF and SIPRI data are excluded
from this license: they remain the property of their publishers and are used here with
citation under their own terms.